

## Final report

# **Judicial (In)dependence in New Democracies. Courts, Presidents and Legislatures in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa**

Hamburg, 8. February 2016

Ref. SAW-2011-GIGA-5 4 - Final Report


Dear Sirs,

The following pages present the final report of the project "Judicial (In)dependence in New Democracies. Courts, Presidents and Legislatures in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa", which was developed at GIGA between 2011 and 2015 under my coordination. A general overview of the results includes six scientific articles (two peer-reviewed high-impact journal articles, two articles still under review, two book chapters), five GIGA Focus (the GIGA publication that connects research findings to current sociopolitical events for the broader public), and a number of other related publications. Further results include the project-related dissertations of the two involved PhD students, university seminars taught by the two senior members, 29 workshop and conference participations, as well as one international workshop organized at the GIGA premises.

The current project was approved within the Leibniz funding line that is called "Promoting women for academic leadership positions". There are many different ways in which this line promoted my academic development in the past years, of which I would like to mention three in particular. First, the possibility to build and lead a team of young researchers. Indeed, academic interchanges in this small team of four were constant, friendly, and productive for all of us, as shown by the large number of joint endeavors and collaborative publications. Further cooperation is already in the planning for the future. Second, the topic as well as the two-region coverage of the research enlarged the scope of work I had done until now. The project was initially a challenge, but also an opportunity to put in practice and gather experience in the Comparative Area Studies that GIGA proclaims in its profile. We were successful in this respect: we carefully designed the cross-regional comparison of six countries, managed to implement it empirically, and brought the results into academic publications. Third, on individual terms, the successful management of this project certainly helped my own career prospect within GIGA, where I became the Leader of Research Program 1 in March 2015.

The following pages are a summary of the academic results. I am available for further explanations and clarifications if needed.

Yours sincerely,



## **Project's Title**

Judicial (In)dependence in New Democracies. Courts, Presidents and Legislatures in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa

## **Project's Webpage**

<https://giga.hamburg/de/projekt/judicial-independence-in-new-democracies-courts-presidents-and-legislatures-in-latin-america>

## **Team**

Dr. Mariana Llanos

Since May 2015: Lead Research Fellow of GIGA's RP 1  
"Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems"

Prof. Dr. Alexander Stroh

Since April 2015: Junior professor at University Bayreuth  
2006 - 2015: Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs

Charlotte Heyl

Research Fellow / Doctoral Student

GIGA Institut für Afrika-Studien

Dissertation in progress: The Contribution of Constitutional Courts to the Democratic Quality of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa

Heyl traces in her PhD project if and how constitutional courts influence directly and indirectly the democratic quality of elections. For this purpose she develops an analytical framework for the examination of courts' decisions and their repercussions on three dimensions of the democratic quality of elections: participation, competition and legitimacy. The Madagascan High Constitutional and the Senegalese Constitutional Council serve as comparative case studies for the analysis. The dissertation project specifies theoretically the widely assumed positive link between constitutional courts and democracy by focusing on electoral disputes that are so far rarely analyzed in the academic debate. Furthermore, it offers new empirical data on the under-researched constitutional courts of Madagascar and Senegal.

Cordula Tibi Weber

Research Fellow / Doctoral Student

GIGA Institut für Lateinamerika-Studien

Dissertation in progress: Exploring the Roles of Courts in New Democracies

In her PhD project, Tibi Weber explores how the roles of highest courts can be categorized and compared among countries. Using the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal and the Paraguayan Supreme Court as case studies, she analyzes three dimensions that may explain differences in the roles of courts: formal rules and resulting veto players, attitudinal aspects, and the legal culture. The dissertation project contributes to the academic debate in two particular ways: first, it adds knowledge to the relatively new debate on the roles of courts and links the performance of courts to the literature on the quality of democracy. Second, it provides new empirical data on a very under-researched country: Paraguay.



## **Project Goals**

The project analyzed different degrees of judicial independence and dealt especially with the following questions:

- Which structural arrangements are designed to promote the insulation of judges from undue pressure?
- What is the political context in which courts operate?
- What mechanisms (formal and informal) have the elected branches of government employed to increase their influence on the judicial branch?
- What impact has political influence had on judicial structure, appointments, tenure? What factors (for example, competitiveness of the party system, constitutional rules, political ideology, international pressure, and informal practices) explain different degrees of political constraints on judicial independence?

## **Contribution to International Research**

This study of judicial independence shows the interaction among the three branches of government and concentrates, especially, on the ways in which the two elected branches – the executive and the legislature – interfere with the judicial branch. The project stressed the difficult balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. Theoretically, the project contributed new insights to the academic debate on judicial formal institutions, informal politics, and the role of political actors in judicial departures. Empirically, it provided original data on under-researched countries in the judicial politics literature (particularly, Paraguay and the African cases in the sample).

## **Research Design and Methods**

This project adopted a cross-regional small-N comparative design that included six cases from two different regions. The cases belong to similar intraregional contexts in terms of culture and history, but have differential judicial independence assessments. In short, the sample includes one pair each of best-performers (Chile, Benin), medium-performers (Argentina, Senegal), and low-performers (Paraguay, Madagascar). Benin and Chile are renowned for their powerful constitutional courts and the low level of direct political interference with these courts' actions, whereas Argentina's and Senegal's relatively professional judges are exposed to intermittent political interference. Weak judiciaries that face outright political influence are reported for Madagascar and Paraguay.

The project collected data on constitutional and statutory norms (and the successive amendments to them) as well as on actual cases of judges' appointments or removals, the approval of budgetary enlargements or reductions, the creation of new courts, etc. These data helped us approximate both a *de jure* and a *de facto* assessment of judicial independence.

## **Main results**

-an index of formal judicial independence that reflects the degree of judicial independence in five dimensions (ex ante constraints, ex post constraints, powers, access, reach). (Stroh and Heyl 2015).

-a conceptualisation of informal interference in the judiciary that distinguishes these actions according to types – direct or subtle –with different levels of severity as well as an empirical study of informal interference through 145 semi-structured interviews including 45 high court judges (Llanos et al 2015).

-a dataset on judicial tenures and judicial departures containing inter alia data on all former and sitting judges of the six selected countries since democratisation (to be available after publication). Based on these data, a comparative analysis of due and undue judicial departures in the six selected third-wave developing democracies (Llanos et al, under review).

- case-studies on judicial reforms, judicial appointments and departures.

- studies on the state of the executive-judicial relations in the selected countries and their respective regions.

*Please consult respective publication for further details. The abstracts are included in the following pages; full publications available upon request*

### **Related Teaching Activities**

- 2013: Seminar *Presidential Power and Its Limits*. Leuphana Universität, Lüneburg. Fakultät Kulturwissenschaften - Institut für Politikwissenschaft. Block seminar in November. Mariana Llanos
- 2012-13: Seminar on *Constitutions in Latin America: Institutional Change and Human Rights*. Social Sciences Faculty, University of Hamburg. Winter Semester. Mariana Llanos and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor
- 2014: Seminar *Presidential Power and Its Limits*. Social Sciences Faculty, University of Hamburg. Summer Semester. Mariana Llanos
- 2014-15 Seminar „Die Judikative: politischer Akteur demokratischer Entwicklung“, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg. Alexander Stroh.
- 2015: Seminar *Constitutionalism in Latin America: Mutual Reinforcement or Contradictions between Rights and Political Institutions?*. Sciences Faculty, University of Hamburg. Summer Semester. Mariana Llanos and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor

## Publications

### Peer-Reviewed Articles

Mariana Llanos, Cordula Tibi Weber, Charlotte Heyl & Alexander Stroh (2015) "Informal interference in the judiciary in new democracies: a comparison of six African and Latin American cases". *Democratization*, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2015.1081170.

This article focuses on the efforts of power holders – at the executive or the legislative level – to influence or curb court activity informally or extralegally, an acknowledged but under-researched topic in studies of judicial politics. We first define informal judicial interference and operationalize the concept; we then explain how we collected information on the topic through systematic cross-country interviewing. Our concept focuses on judicial intervention actions exercised by political actors once judges are on the bench. We distinguish these actions according to type – direct or subtle – and further differentiate each type according to six different modes. We provide new empirical data on informal interference in six third-wave democracies, three in Africa (Benin, Madagascar, and Senegal) and three in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay). Our empirical findings, first, confirm the importance of informal practices in shaping political judicial relations. Second, they point to long-standing legacies and to the level of socio-economic development as possible explanations for different performances in terms of the prevalence and severity of informal interference in the judiciary in these newly established democratic regimes.

Stroh, Alexander, and Charlotte Heyl. 2015. "Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts." *Comparative Politics* 47(2): 169–87.

The creation of constitutional courts is a political affair because the judicial review of laws and competences potentially curbs the power of the elected branches. This paper seeks to explain the spread of constitutional courts and the extent of their formal independence. Our comparison of nine former French colonies in West Africa is built upon (a) the combination of the two competing theories of international diffusion and domestic strategic action—the political insurance model—and (b) a new, theoretically and arithmetically refined index of formal independence. The empirical analysis in this area of similar political context supports the argument that global trends and foreign reference models set a minimum standard and that interests in political insurance determine the deviations from institutional diffusion.

Mariana Llanos, Charlotte Heyl, Viola Lucas, Alexander Stroh, Cordula Tibi Weber "Ousted from the Bench? Judicial Departures in Six Young Democracies". *Currently Under Review* (Submitted to *Comparative Political Studies* in December 2015).

This article deals with judicial departures in consolidating democracies. It investigates to what extent and under what conditions judges in those contexts are not able to decide on their departures themselves but are rather forced to leave due to pressure from the elected branches. We undertook a cross-regional study of individual judicial departures in six consolidating democracies with elected presidents, three of them located in Latin America (Argentina, Chile and Paraguay) and three in sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Madagascar and Senegal). We developed a unique data set containing information on 143 high-court judges in office since democratization. We classified judicial departures as due and undue, and using a survival model we estimated the impact of institutional, political, personal, and contextual factors. The results highlight that undue judicial departures occur regardless of the region, but are most probable under the rule of politically powerful executives, and under lower levels of democracy and development.

### Book Chapters

Tibi Weber, Cordula and Mariana Llanos (2016): "Between Independence and Control: Recent Developments within the Judiciary in Latin America", in: Víctor González (ed.): *Economy, Politics and Governance: Challenges for the 21st Century*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 101-115.

There exist few publications that analyze judicial independence in Latin America as a whole. With this chapter we increase the knowledge on the current state of judiciary-elected branch-relations in this region. The chapter compares the latest wave of clashes (January 2012-December 2014) between power holders and highest courts in Latin America. We found that judicial independence is still highly contested within the region and that Courts are exposed to

different degrees of politicization. The cases that interfere most with the democratic function of horizontal control attributed to courts are those where congresses use impeachment proceedings to render courts or individual judges accountable. In contrast, the judiciary is more likely to withstand the political interference if political actors promote judicial reforms aiming at an increased control of the judiciary or if deeper debates on the role of the judiciary in the political regime arise.

Llanos, Mariana. 2014. "Acción estratégica y cultura de la informalidad: la reforma judicial en Argentina", in: Isabel Wences, Rosa Conde and Adrián Bonilla (eds.), *Cultura de la Legalidad en Iberoamérica: Desafíos y Experiencias*, pp.277-296. San José: Flacso.

This chapter analyses court-executive relations in Argentina by focusing particularly on the inter-institutional movements around two politically crucial Supreme Court decisions taken in 2013: one against the executive's preferences (the unconstitutionality of the judicial council reform) and one in favor (the constitutionality of four articles of the media law). It provides evidence for the strategic behavior of the Argentine Supreme Court reconstructing the chronology of events taking place in the time span between April 2013 and the end of this year. Strategic behavior has already been marked as a prominent feature of judicial behavior in Argentina (Helmke 2005), taking the form of judicial defection which developed as a reaction to an informal institution dictating that presidents can remove incumbent judges when they come to office. This chapter shows that the judges' strategic reaction to their political environment is today characterized by negotiation rather than defection, a behavior based on the informal institution that allows subtle communications between judges and politicians. If the judges' goal with defection was securing their posts, negotiations involve other individual and collective interests, such as policy, reputation, and corporatist benefits. Empirically, the paper uses newspaper archives as well as the systematic analysis of 23 interviews with actors and experts conducted in May 2013.

### GIGA Working Papers

Mariana Llanos, Cordula Tibi Weber, Charlotte Heyl, Alexander Stroh. 2014. *Informal Interference in the Judiciary in New Democracies: A Comparison of Six African and Latin American Cases*. GIGA Working Paper No. 249.

Stroh, Alexander and Charlotte Heyl. 2013. *Diffusion versus Strategic Action? The Creation of West African Constitutional Courts Revisited*. GIGA Working Paper No. 239.

Stroh, Alexander. 2016. "The Consequences of Appointment Policies for Court Legitimacy in Benin: A Network Analysis Approach." GIGA Working Paper No. 281.

The paper seeks to explain the acquisition of legitimacy that turns courts in new and vulnerable democracies into credible actors able to facilitate or even foster the consolidation of democracy. Analysing the case of the Constitutional Court of Benin (CCB), it shows that governmental appointment policies have had an important impact on the court's legitimacy. This West African country is considered to have been continuously democratic since 1991, and the court was established by consensus during the transition. The findings suggest that perceptions of fair representation on the bench matter more for credibility than professional qualifications and the quality of adjudication. And contrary to the widespread narrative that African politics is basically shaped by ethnicity, short-term political affiliations appear to matter more than communalistic representation. Network analysis using original social data on the major politicians and all 25 CCB judges since the court's creation in 1993 provides the evidence for this argument. By broadening the insights from Benin, the paper ultimately argues that the appointment-policy-driven delegitimation of an established and largely credible political arbiter can put democratic consolidation at risk. Ruling elites therefore hold the major responsibility.

### GIGA Focus

Heyl, Charlotte and Julia Leininger. 2012. *Mali – Hinter den Kullissen der ehemaligen Musterdemokratie*, GIGA Focus Afrika, 10.

Stroh, Alexander. 2013. Stabilitätsanker Verfassung: Kleine Reformen Und Große Ängste in Benin. GIGA Fokus Afrika, 4.

Llanos, Mariana and Cordula Tibi Weber. 2013. Die Justiz in Lateinamerika: zwischen Unabhängigkeit und Kontrolle, GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 09.

Stroh, Alexander and Charlotte Heyl. 2014. Verfassungsgerichte in Westafrika: unabhängige Krisenmanager?. GIGA Focus Afrika, 01.

Llanos, Mariana. 2015. Argentinien – Politik, Wahlen und Gerechtigkeit, GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 04. Hamburg: GIGA.

#### Other related publications

Llanos, Mariana and Leany Lemos. 2013. "Presidential Preferences: The Federal Supreme Tribunal Nominations in Democratic Brazil". *Latin American Politics and Society*, Volume 55, Issue 2, 77-105.

Marsteintredet Leiv, Mariana Llanos, and Detlef Nolte. 2013. "Paraguay and The Politics of Impeachment" (with). *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp.110-123.

Llanos Mariana, Cordula Tibi Weber and Detlef Nolte. 2012. Paraguai: Golpe ou voto de desconfiança?, in: *Revista Conjuntura Austral*, 3, 14, 4-17.

Llanos Mariana, Detlef Nolte, and Cordula Tibi Weber. 2012. Paraguay: Staatsstreich oder "Misstrauensvotum"?, GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 08.



## **Fieldwork**

The project's fieldwork was divided into two parts: the first one, which we named "field exploration" aimed at strengthening the links with local partners and at appointing research assistants in the countries of study. The second part, or "field research" took place about half a year later, when data gathered by the research assistant could be evaluated and eventually completed, and when the project researchers personally undertook interviews with relevant actors (judges, politicians, civil society, journalists), following a previously designed questionnaire which was applied in all six cases.

### Field exploration

PARAGUAY: 5.-12.05.2012 (Tibi Weber)

CHILE: 13.-21.05.2012 (Tibi Weber)

ARGENTINA: 15-22.07.2012 (Llanos)

SENEGAL: 15.01-22.01.2012 (Stroh and Heyl)

MALI: 23.01.-29.01.2012 (Stroh and Heyl)

BENIN: 30.01.-04.02.2012 (Stroh and Heyl)

### *Field Exploration Activities*

-Background and cooperation talks with national researchers, representatives of NGOs, political actors, German Foundations.

-strengthen links with local partners

-realization of round tables on judicial independence with national experts.

-work contracts with research assistants in the three countries.

-visits to the Constitutional and Supreme Courts.

-attendance to related seminars and conferences available during those days.

-visits to libraries and collection of relevant literature in all countries.

### Field research

PARAGUAY: 28.09.-11.11.2012 (Tibi Weber)

CHILE: 2.11.-16.12.12 (Tibi Weber)

BENIN: 2.09.-28.09.2012 (Stroh)

MALI: 14.10-20.10.2012 (Heyl)

SENEGAL: 11.09.-14.10.2012, 20.10-09.11.2012 (Heyl), 29.09-07.10.2012 (Stroh)

MADAGASCAR: 04.04.-01.06.2013 (Heyl)

ARGENTINA: 01.05.13-18.05.2013 (Llanos)

*Field Research Activities*

-Realization of semi-structured interviews: interviewees included current and former judges from the highest court, representatives of judicial appointing institutions (presidency, congress, judicial council), and carefully selected expert observers (magistrates, lawyers, academics, journalists, NGO representatives, and relevant development advisors). A total of 117 interviews were carried out in the six countries between January 2012 and June 2013, and 45 of the interviewees were supreme or constitutional court judges.

-Reception and finalization of the research assistants' data collection of judges' biographies: we ultimately developed a unique data set containing information on 143 high-court judges in office in the selected democracies since democratization that was used in Llanos et al (under review). This is the first collection of original and systematic data on high-court judicial departures in African democracies, and the first time that Latin American departures are analyzed with a cross-regional perspective.

-Realization of background talks with academics.

-Visits to state institutions in order to collect relevant official documents (budget laws, appointment decrees, etc.

-Archival work at leading newspapers

-Collection of primary and secondary documents

*Field Research Difficulties*

Research in Mali became difficult after the military coup in April 2012 and the subsequent escalation of the armed conflict in northern Mali. We decided to postpone fieldwork and we indeed carried out a short research stay in Mali in October 2012 to check how the situation was. However, after the French intervention commenced on January 11, 2013, field work turned impossible. Officially, the German Government called all German citizens to leave Mali and also the Malian project partners urged us to cancel fieldwork. Due to time constraints in our project, Mali was replaced by Madagascar. The latter had already been identified as a potentially alternative case at the stage of the project design, but it had been dropped mainly due to geographic considerations.

## **Workshop in Hamburg**

27.-28.02.2014: International Workshop "Courts under Pressure: Formal und Informal Dynamics of Political Intervention in New Democracies" at the GIGA.

Organisers: Mariana Llanos, Charlotte Heyl, Alexander Stroh und Cordula Tibi Weber

Webpage: <https://giga.hamburg/en/event/courts-under-pressure-formal-und-informal-dynamics-of-political-intervention-in-new>



### List of Guests

Santiago Basabe-Serrano (GIGA Hamburg/Flacso Ecuador)

Benjamin Engst (University of Göttingen)

Roberto Gargarella (Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires)

Siri Gloppen (University of Bergen, Norway)

Lisa Heemann (University of Gießen)

Carlo Guarnieri (University of Bologna)

Elena Martínez Barahona (University of Salamanca)

Julio Ríos-Figueroa (CIDE, Mexico)

Raul Sanchez Urribarri (La Trobe University, Melbourne)

Rachel Sieder (CIESAS, Mexico)

Jeffrey Staton (Emory University, Atlanta)

Alexei Trochev (Nazarbayev University, Astana)

Stefan Voigt (University of Hamburg)

Peter Von Doepp (University of Vermont)

## Conferences and Workshops

### Mariana Llanos

4 - 7 September 2013. ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux. Paper presented: Informal Interferences with the Judiciary. A Comparison of Six African and Latin American Cases. (with Cordula Tibi Weber, Charlotte Heyl, Alexander Stroh).

25-27 de septiembre de 2013: ALACIP, VII Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, Bogotá, Colombia. Presentation: "Informal Interferences with the Judiciary. A Comparison of Six African and Latin American Cases" (with Cordula Tibi Weber, Charlotte Heyl, Alexander Stroh).

3-4 April 2014: SLAS (Society for Latin American Studies), 50th Anniversary Conference, , Birkbeck, University of London. Paper presented: "Court-executive Relations in Argentina: Strategic Negotiations and Informal institutions".

21-24 May 2014: LASA (Latin American Studies Association), Annual Conference, Chicago. Paper presented: "Why do judges leave the bench? Evidence from African and Latin American Cases" (with Charlotte Heyl, Cordula Tibi Weber, Alexander Stroh).

22-24 July 2015: ALACIP (Latin American Association of Political Science) 8° Congress, , Lima. Paper presented: "Why do Judges Leave the Bench? Evidence from Africa and Latin America" (with Charlotte Heyl, Cordula Tibi Weber, Viola Lucas, Alexander Stroh)

Other connected workshops and lectures:

16-17 October 2013: International Seminar Cultura de la legalidad en Iberoamérica, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucional (CEPC) – Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Flacso). Madrid. Paper presented: "Cultura de la legalidad e instituciones políticas en Argentina".

12.09.2014. AMECIP (Mexican Association of Political Science) Second International Congress of Political Science, Toluca, Mexico. "Las relaciones entre el poder político y las cortes en nuevas democracias. Algunas reflexiones para el estudio de las instituciones políticas".

14.05.15. Sao Paulo (USP, Department of Political Science): "Why do judges leave the bench? Evidence from Africa and Latin America".

20.10.15. Belo Horizonte (UFMG, International Seminar, Department of Political Science): "Comparing Courts cross-regionally: lessons and challenges".

### Alexander Stroh

8-1 July 2012; World Conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Madrid, Spain; Paper presentation "The Judiciary's Autonomy and Power in Flux"

November 2012; Workshop of the Law School on Constitutional Courts in Africa, Justus-Liebig-University, Giessen, Germany; Presentation of the project

7-29 June 2013; European Conference of African Studies, Lisbon, Portugal; Panel organization "Courts and Politics: Dynamics and Challenges for the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Africa's Judiciaries" and paper presentation "The Creation of Constitutional Courts in West Africa"

25-27 February 2015; DVPW Comparative Politics Section Conference “Weltregionen im Vergleich,” Hamburg, Germany; Paper presentation “Assessing Formal Independence of Constitutional Review Bodies Across Regions”

17-21 August 2015; Bergen Exchanges on Law & Social Transformation, Norway; Presentation “Judicial Independence, Informal Interference, and Judicial Networks”

26-29 August 2015; ECPR General Conference, Montréal, Canada; Panel organization and paper presentation “The consequences of appointment policies for court legitimacy in Benin: A network analysis approach”

The following workshops are not directly related to the project and were funded by different sources. However they can be seen as successful initiatives to broaden the impact of the research agenda established by the SAW project and to make research on the topic sustainable beyond the project’s lifetime.

4-10 December 2014; Point Sud Workshop “African Courts: Actors, Institutional Developments and Governance” at LASDEL Niamey, Niger; project member Alexander Stroh was a co-convenor with colleagues from the Universities of Accra, Mainz and Niamey; workshop funded by DFG

26-27 March 2015; International Workshop “Informal Networks in Non-Western Judiciaries: Comparative Perspectives” at the Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, Australia; project member Alexander Stroh was a co-convenor with colleagues from ANU and La Trobe University Melbourne; workshop funded by the ANU.

#### Charlotte Heyl

14 November 2012; Workshop of the Law School on Constitutional Courts in Africa, Justus-Liebig-University, Giessen, Germany; Presentation of the project

27-29 June 2013; European Conference of African Studies, Lisbon, Portugal; Panel organization “Courts and Politics: Dynamics and Challenges for the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Africa’s Judiciaries” and paper presentation “The Creation of Constitutional Courts in West Africa”

3-6 April 2014; Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, USA; paper presentation “Constitutional Courts in Sub-Saharan Africa: Impartial Referees in Elections?”.

12-14 June 2014; African Studies Association in Germany, Bayreuth, Germany; paper presentation “Constitutional Courts and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa”.

18 June 2014; Workshop “Challenges to Democratization in Africa: The Case of Mali”, Hamburg, Germany; co-organization of workshop, paper presentation “Mali’s Constitutional Court: An Impartial Referee in Elections?”.

2 September 2014; Australian National University, RegNet Seminar, Canberra, Australia, presentation of PhD-project “The Contribution of Constitutional Courts to the Democratic Quality of Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa”.

24 –26 October 2014; Conference “Establishing Constitutional Courts: Drivers of Democracy or Government of Judges?”, Gießen, Germany; Conference participation.

5-10 December 2014; Point Sud-Workshop “African Courts: Actors, Institutional Developments and Governance”, Niamey, Niger; paper presentation “African Constitutional Courts and Elections”.

Cordula Tibi Weber

-11-15 March 2013: 41st ECPR Joint Sessions. Presentation: “Informal Interference with the Judiciary in New Democracies” (Conference paper written with Mariana Llanos, Charlotte Heyl and Alexander Stroh). 12.03.2013, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz.

-26.6.-5.7.2013: ECPR Summer School on Latin American Politics. Presentation: “Right Defenders or Arbiters of Political Conflicts: Explaining the Role of Courts - The Role of the Paraguayan Supreme Court”. 01.07.2013, GIGA Hamburg.

-10.-15.04.2014 : 42nd ECPR Joint Sessions Salamanca. Presentation: on 12th of April: “Why Do Judges Leave the Bench? Evidence from African and Latin American Cases”. 12.04.2014. Discussant of the paper “Analysing the Quality of Justice in 16 Latin American Supreme Courts” by Santiago Basabe-Serrano.

-03.-05.07.2014: 5th ECPR Graduate Conference Innsbruck. Presentation: “Exploring the Roles of Courts in New Democracies” in the Panel “Politics and Institutions in Latin America” on Friday, 4<sup>th</sup>; discussant of the Paper “Legislative Activity in Latin America: To What Extent do Parliamentary Resources Influence in Levels of Legislative Production?” by Theresa Kernecker.

-03.-06.09.2014. ECPR General Conference Glasgow, Chair of the Panel “Judicial Politics in Latin America” on 5<sup>th</sup> of September, presentation: “Exploring the Roles of Courts in New Democracies”; discussant of the paper “Judicial Reform and the Restructuring of Ecuador’s Political Field: The Judicial Revolution Under Rafael Correa’s Presidency” by Miguel Herrera.